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HYBRIDS OF HYBRIDS? PLURAL FORMS OF COLLABORATION AND 
THE SOCIAL VALUE OF PUBLIC INITIATIVES 
 
Abstract 
 
Although public initiatives often involve multiple collaborative (hybrid) arrangements between 
for-profit, nonprofit, and public actors, we still lack a consolidated framework explaining how a 
single public initiative can involve multiple types of collaboration in tandem.  We examine three 
concurrent hybrids—public collaborations with for-profit firms, with non-profit organizations, 
and between units of the public bureaucracy—and use fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
(fsQCA) to unveil configurations consistent with social value creation (evidence of social 
impact) based on a unique set of 24 public initiatives in Brazil, India, and South Africa.  We find 
configurations involving multiple or plural types of collaboration (“hybrids of hybrids”) and 
inductively propose theoretical mechanisms explaining contingent synergistic effects of those 
hybrids as a function of their resource complementarity and perceived legitimacy. 
 
Key words 
Public-private collaboration, hybrid forms, social value, social impact, public services 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A thriving new field in strategic management has examined how economic actors can 
deploy their resources and capabilities to address pressing social needs (Agarwal, Barney, Foss, 
and Klein, 2009; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, and Pitelis, 2013; Mahoney, McGahan, and Pitelis, 
2009).  Reflecting this trend, research has scrutinized hybrid forms of governance whereby 
public and private actors pool their resources and recombine existing capabilities to support 
innovations with high social value (Cabral, Lazzarini, and Azevedo, 2013; Kivleniece and 
Quelin, 2012; Rangan, Samii, and Van Wassenhove, 2006; Rufín and Rivera-Santos, 2012).  
Interestingly, this new trend in strategy converges with important new directions in the field of 
public management.  After decades of research on how to increase the efficiency of public 
bureaucracies (Hood, 1991), the field is moving towards a more synergistic view of public action 
describing how multiple actors, public or private, can effectively create value in the form of 
tangible societal benefits (Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg, 2015; Moore, 1995). 
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Collaboration, however, remains a complex phenomenon; socially-oriented actors can 
interact and generate social value in myriad ways.  Although the extant literature has improved 
our understanding of how particular forms of collaboration work—such as public-private 
partnerships involving for-profit private actors (Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic, 2014; Kivleniece 
and Quelin, 2012) or alliances between public actors and nonprofit organizations (Alexander and 
Nank, 2009; Bennett and Iossa, 2009; Gazley and Brudney, 2007)—in practice we often observe 
that multiple forms of collaboration are not only common but also used in tandem (Andrews and 
Entwitle, 2010).  For instance, the municipality of Curitiba, in Brazil, designed an innovative bus 
rapid transport (BRT) system to provide fast, low-cost transportation to local citizens, later 
adopted in several countries (Lindau, Hidalgo, and Facchini, 2010).  The project involved a 
complex array of collaborations, including alliances within and outside the public bureaucracy.  
For example, the Swedish multinational Volvo helped to design customized buses and innovative 
bus stops (“public-private” collaboration); local, nonprofit research centers provided technical 
support and training to the workforce (“public-nonprofit” collaboration); and the city 
government orchestrated a web of internal partnerships between state units such as the public 
transport authority and urban planning institute (“public-public” collaboration).       
Despite the apparent importance of these hybrids, there is still little understanding of how 
alternative forms of collaboration might differ from each other and the conditions in which they 
might be combined to generate social value.  Should we expect a synergistic combination of 
various types of collaboration?  Which conditions will increase the odds that different 
combinations of collaboration-type will succeed?  We examine these questions using a multiple-
case comparative study of 24 public initiatives in Brazil, India, and South Africa.  These 
countries are large emerging economies that suffer from a deficit of essential public services for 
a substantial portion of their population, combined with many voids related to poor infrastructure 
and access (Khanna and Palepu, 2013).  These voids, however, are not uniform: even in 
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emerging markets it is possible to find effective public bureaucracies conducting socially-
oriented innovations, often at a local level (Tendler, 1997).  This feature allowed us to find 
projects with heterogeneous performance with robust evidence of social value creation.  Namely, 
we searched for projects for which there were sufficient data or existing impact assessment 
studies allowing us to check not only the performance of the project per se, but also its 
counterfactual: that is, what would probably have happened to the target population if the project 
had not been implemented (Donaldson, Christie, and Mark, 2015; Kroeger and Weber, 2014).  
We use fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to examine multiple 
collaborative configurations consistent with high impact (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009).  This 
technique is appropriate in our context given the number of successful and failed cases in our 
sample—not large enough for traditional econometric analysis but not small enough for 
qualitative cross-case comparison.  Starting from the coding of conditions leading to observable 
outcomes, QCA applies Boolean algebra to arrive at multiple “solutions” or combinations of 
conditions consistent with success (Fiss, 2007).  Importantly, our analysis unveils what we refer 
to as collaboration plurality.  Instead of focusing on the effect of each type of alliance, we find 
conditions through which multiple alliance types can jointly help create social value.  Following 
previous studies in management (Bell, Filatotchev, and Aguilera, 2014; Campbell, Sirmon, and 
Schijven, 2016), we use our fsQCA results to inductively propose a new theoretical framework 
on how plural collaborative forms promote social value depending on a host of contextual 
factors, including local characteristics of the political and economic environment.   
In this sense, our work brings important contributions to the literature.  Advancing 
existing discussions in strategic management on the interdependence between public and private 
interests (Agarwal et al., 2009; Mahoney et al., 2009), we provide new evidence that successful 
public initiatives often “mix and match” distinct types of collaboration and propose a new 
theoretical framework explaining their synergistic effects.  In line with previous work examining 
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the plurality of organizational decisions (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ménard, 2013; Parmigiani, 
2007), we explain the emergence of plural hybrid forms where distinct types of collaboration 
complement one another in discrete configurations resembling “hybrids of hybrids” (e.g. public 
initiatives supported by collaborations with for-profit and nonprofit firms).  We propose that 
distinct types of collaboration differ in their perceived legitimacy and the heterogeneous 
resources brought by internal and external partners.  Given these two factors, we submit that the 
synergistic effect of distinct collaborations is contextual.  For instance, the legitimacy of public-
private ties increases when governments face resource scarcity, while the risk that these for-
profit actors will over-emphasize narrow economic objectives can be tempered by the 
simultaneous engagement of socially-oriented nonprofits.  
We also show that private participation in social initiatives, far from simply acting as a 
substitute for inefficient governments (e.g. Auerswald, 2009: 54), actually requires concurrent 
public action in the form of internal (public-public) collaborations between units within the 
public bureaucracy, which have been relatively understudied (Andrews and Entwistle, 2010; 
Cabral and Krane, Forthcoming).  In addition, our analysis reveal that an apparent necessary 
condition for multiple hybrids to work is the presence of strong public operational capacity to 
lead and execute value-creating initiatives (e.g. Moore, 1995).  An important implication is that 
the analysis of interdependent public-private action should incorporate processes and capabilities 
inside governments, thus calling for more dialogue and conceptual integration between strategy 
and public administration scholarly work focused on the determinants of social value. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: COLLABORATION FOR SOCIAL VALUE 
Interdependent Public and Private Interests in Strategic and Public Management 
 A recent movement in strategic management has tried to improve our understanding of 
how public and private actors can interact to address societal issues (Barney, 2005; Hitt, 2005; 
Mahoney, McGahan and Pitelis, 2009), and jointly stimulate innovations in the public interest 
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(Klein, Mahoney, McGahan and Pitelis, 2010). Although early work has viewed public action as 
an external, catalytic force affecting the costs of private entrepreneurship (Porter, 1990), we now 
have discussions describing how public and private actors can collaborate to craft initiatives in 
their mutual interest (McGahan, Zelner and Barney, 2013; Cabral, Lazzarini, and Azevedo, 
2013; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, and Pitelis, 2013).  More precisely, initiatives triggered by 
public and private actors can create social value, defined as all the tangible benefits that these 
initiatives generate to local communities and all relevant stakeholders  (Kivleniece and Quelin, 
2012; Kroeger and Weber, 2014; Mahoney et al., 2009; Porter and Kramer, 2011).  Recognition 
of the complex interplay between public and private actors opens new questions on how their 
interaction drives the creation of public value. 
Aligned with this new trend in strategic management, a new research stream called Public 
Value Management (PVM) considers that public value is created when all relevant actors, public 
or private, craft projects aligned with citizens’ preferences and needs at a reasonable cost 
(Bozeman, 2007; Moore, 1995).  Thus, the concept of public value adopted in PVM is well 
aligned with concepts of social value in strategic management.  Although discussions in strategic 
management tend to overemphasize the role of private firms in addressing societal needs (e.g. 
Porter and Kramer, 2011; Prahalad, 2004), the concepts overlap if we consider that all actors, 
public or private, can generate tangible benefits to well-defined target populations (Bryson et al., 
2015).  Also, rather than assuming a marked division between public and private roles, PVM 
sees a more encompassing collection of multiple parties trying to create and sustain value-
creating collaborations (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Bryson et al., 2015; Stoker, 2006).  Therefore, 
both literatures have converged towards a more collaborative, relational approach of how 
interdependent public and private actors can promote social value.  
Forms of Collaboration and their Effect on Initiatives for Social Value 
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Given this convergence between strategic and public management on the importance of 
collaborative efforts to create social value, a natural question emerges: Which types of 
collaboration are conducive to superior social value, and under which conditions?  Below we 
examine the benefits and costs of three types of hybrids: public collaborations with for-profit 
firms (which we refer to as “public-private”), with non-profit organizations (“public-nonprofit”), 
and between multiple units of the public bureaucracy (“public-public”).   
Public-Private Collaboration.  This type is perhaps the most studied form of 
collaboration in the economics and management literatures.  There has been substantial work on 
so-called public-private partnerships, whereby governments craft and sponsor activities that are 
executed and partially funded by private firms (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Engel et al., 2014; 
Kivleniece and Quelin, 2012).   An advantage of those partnerships is that they can marshal 
complementary resources and capabilities possessed by public and private actors (Fabrizio, 
2012; Rangan et al., 2006).  Thus, private firms can bring their external experience from 
previous projects, proprietary technology, and extra funding capacity, whereas governments can 
sponsor socially-relevant activities and define parameters for effective social interventions.  
Also, if public-private partnerships involve profit-oriented firms, then their typical higher-
powered incentives promote superior capabilities for efficient execution, leading to lower costs 
and higher productivity (Cabral et al., 2010, 2013; Engel et al., 2014). 
 Yet these higher-powered incentives also create a risk that private operators will 
emphasize cost reduction at the expense of service quality and other relevant externalities that 
would otherwise increase social value (Hart, 2003; Williamson, 1999), especially in the case of 
exchange dimensions that are more difficult to measure and enforce (Brown and Potoski, 2003; 
Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Levin and Tadelis, 2010).  Williamson (1999), in particular, 
talks about the need to preserve probity in public activities, which can be undermined by the 
profit-based motivation of private firms.  The participation of for-profit firms in public services 
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is also normally criticized on the grounds that these services are the responsibility of 
governments and should emphasize social instead of economic goals (Dahl and Soss, 2014).  
Recent research in strategic management has emphasized how stakeholder groups, including 
beneficiaries, activists and even members of the public bureaucracy, may oppose “privatization” 
initiatives that are seen as exploiting public resources for private gain (Henisz, Dorobantu, and 
Nartey, 2014; Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012).  In a similar vein, PVM 
scholars stress the role of societal norms and principles in dictating the perceived legitimacy of 
how public services are delivered (Bozeman, 2007; Moore, 1995).  Therefore, the degree of 
perceived legitimacy plays an important role when making judgements about the relative benefits 
and risks of including for-profit partners.   
Public-Nonprofit Collaboration.  This type of collaboration occurs when the public 
sector engages in joint activities with nonprofit firms such as institutes, foundations, or civil 
society organizations more generally.  Although relatively less studied than more traditional 
public-private partnerships, these alliances are pervasive in the public sector (Gazley and 
Brudney, 2007; Valero and Jang, 2016).  Nonprofits contribute with distinct sets of resources and 
capabilities that are normally not found in for-profit organizations.  First, they tend to be 
mission-driven and specialized in particular social issues, leading them to focus on objectives 
and outcomes that are more aligned with a well-defined group of beneficiaries (Drucker, 1989; 
McDonald, 2007).  Second, the incentives of nonprofits are not as high-powered as the 
incentives of for-profit firms, since their managers do not capture a substantial portion of the 
organization’s residual cash flow (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  These features mitigate the 
aforementioned hazard of private partners focusing on efficiency at the expense of social benefits 
(Bennett and Iossa, 2009).  Thus, compared to public-private collaborations, public-nonprofit ties 
tend to increase the perceived legitimacy of private engagement, potentially increasing the 
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confidence of public officials that nonprofits will put greater emphasis on the social needs of 
target populations (Witesman and Fernandez, 2013). 
Yet public-nonprofit collaborations are far from a panacea.  They may lack the 
specialized, proprietary knowledge possessed by for-profit firms, especially in the case of public 
initiatives that require novel and advanced solutions.  By having restricted cash flow rights, 
managers of nonprofits will tend to face less pressure to perform, unless they are intrinsically 
motivated or subject to competitive pressure to attract sponsors (Glaeser, 2007).  In other words, 
the lower-powered incentives of nonprofits can be a source of advantage to increase their 
perceived legitimacy, though this may become a liability if the public project requires efficient 
and cost-effective project execution.     
Public-Public Collaboration.  Far from being monolithic, governments often have a web 
of specialized structures dealing with diverse activities such as project design, legal enforcement, 
and service delivery.  Especially in the case of governments overseeing large populations, 
unified structures were progressively replaced with more disaggregated structures focusing on 
narrower, specialized tasks (Greer, 1994).  Although increased decentralization allowed for more 
autonomous decision making and localized learning, it also created the challenge of coordinating 
efforts among interdependent public units (Sen, 1976).  To increase the effectiveness of policy 
making and implementation, governments had to devise integrating mechanisms to foster 
interaction among increasingly autonomous units (Boston, 1992; Peters, 1998).  In this 
environment, public-public collaborations have emerged as the coordinated effort of two or more 
public agencies to jointly plan and execute integrative projects.  These collaborations can occur 
either across distinct government units (Agranoff and McGuire, 2004), as in the case of 
partnerships between federal and municipal agencies, or between units of the same government.   
Compared to the hybrid forms discussed earlier, public-public ties have been relatively 
less studied (Andrews and Entwitle, 2010).  Consider, for instance, the organization of large 
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events in metropolitan areas (e.g. Cabral and Krane, Forthcoming).   In events mutually 
sponsored by federal and local governments, intergovernmental coordination is necessary to 
properly allocate financial resources and carry out all necessary public investment in 
infrastructure and management resources.  There must also be intense intragovernmental action 
involving units responsible for policing, urban transport, and all relevant support services in 
order to guarantee the security and orderly execution of all planned activities.  Essentially, these 
public-public collaborations can be considered a form of internal hybrid (Zenger and Hesterly, 
1997), given that they promote internal coordination and resource mobilization among more or 
less autonomous public units.  By relying on internal (public) resources, they tend to be 
perceived as more legitimate than external collaborations.  However, an exclusive focus on 
public-public ties precludes access to the heterogeneous—and potentially complementary—
resources possessed by external actors, thereby limiting value-creation potential. 
Although scholarly work on all these forms of collaboration have advanced our 
knowledge of how hybrid arrangements can support the creation of social value, the vast 
majority of studies tend to focus on each collaboration type in isolation.  Even in cases where 
these multiple alliances are jointly assessed (e.g. Andrews and Entwitle, 2010), there is scant 
research effort on how multiple collaborations complement one another.  Our previous discussion 
showed that often the shortcomings of one type of collaboration can be a source of advantage for 
another type.  Thus, there is reason to believe that multiple, plural partnerships between 
governments, for-profit firms, and nonprofits can generate important synergies. Different 
combinations of partners will bring different relative contributions of perceived legitimacy and 
resources.   In other words, we still need to understand how and under what conditions plural 
forms of collaboration—mixing different types of collaboration—occur and potentially lead to 
value-creating public initiatives.  Our multiple-case methodology, described next, was designed 
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to empirically observe the outcomes of multiple collaborations and inductively generate a new 
theoretical framework to explain how these hybrids of hybrids can influence social value.  
DATA COLLECTION AND METHOD 
Case Selection 
We built a sample of 24 public service initiatives in Brazil, India, and South Africa.  
Municipal-level projects were chosen in order to allow better comparability across these diverse 
economies. All three countries are large, emerging economies (Pelle, 2007) that, given their 
stage of development, still face important voids in infrastructure and public services (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2013).  To ensure a balanced sample of countries and types of programs, we identified 
four sectors representing critical public services for the target populations: education, 
transportation, urban planning, and bureaucratic services (e.g. services to issue public documents 
or obtain useful information).  In each sector and country, we searched for projects where we 
could show evidence of strong positive social impact (successes), as well as projects with 
evidence of no positive social impact (failures). 
The criterion for labeling a case as “successful” was based on evidence of positive social 
value.  Following our previous discussion, we consider that social value is created when a public 
initiative generates novel and tangible gains valued by the target populations (Auerswald, 2009; 
Kivleniece and Quelin, 2012; Moore, 1995).  Our operationalization of social value creation then 
follows what has been termed as social impact, that is, increases in relevant social dimensions 
compared to a counterfactual, that is, an estimate of what would have occurred without the 
project (Kroeger and Weber, 2014).  This approach, commonly used in the impact analysis of 
public policies (Donaldson, Christie, and Mark, 2015), follows the rationale of a scientific 
experiment: the public initiative is considered a “treatment” that can generate positive impact as 
long as its outcomes are superior to those of a comparable group not subject to the intervention, 
which serves as a counterfactual.  Thus, instead of simply observing whether the initiative was 
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successfully implemented or generated positive results on its own, we also need to gather 
evidence on what happened to comparable groups outside the domain of the project.  
For instance, in 1997 a “one-stop shop” was implemented in the city of Sao Paulo, Brazil, 
to help citizens obtain driver licenses and other official documents.  The objective was to reduce 
the time spent by citizens across a variety of bureaucratic institutions and to reduce the effect of 
costly intermediaries, a critical problem in emerging countries (e.g. Stone, Levy, and Paredes, 
1996).  The new service, labeled “Poupatempo” (in English, “save time”), was very well 
received and consequently implemented in several cities.  To assess the impact of the initiative, 
Fredriksson (2016) used a differences-in-differences technique comparing the time spent by 
citizens in municipalities with and without Poupatempo, before and after the implementation of 
the service in the period 2008-2010.  The study found that Poupatempo reduced the time spent 
on driver license renewals by 29%, compared to the regular service provided by the state, Total 
time savings for the citizens (as an opportunity cost) were estimated to have an economic impact 
of $10.4 million reais per year (around $3.2 million dollars).  This initiative therefore generates 
social value by reducing the time wasted at inefficient public service centers, allowing citizens to 
reallocate their time towards more valuable activities.  We thus consider the assessed impact of 
the project as an empirical indicator of social value creation (Kroeger and Weber, 2014).   
With this criterion in mind, we conducted a broad review of evaluation studies of public 
service initiatives in municipalities across our three target countries.  We searched for cases with 
existing impact assessment studies using counterfactual analysis from multiple sources such as 
repositories of research papers and impact studies (such as the World Bank impact evaluation 
library).  Because many of those studies are devised to test the efficacy of policy 
recommendations, we then narrowed our search to cases where the assessment was associated 
with policies that were effectively implemented.  We then checked whether we could locate and 
secure the participation of former project managers as respondents to our interviews.  In 
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situations where we could not find initiatives with publicly available evaluations, we then 
contacted sector specialists to explore suggestions for other potential cases where positive impact 
could be shown.  Finding publicly available studies on initiatives that failed raised different 
challenges.  We searched the literature and contacted sector specialists, who suggested several 
potential cases.  To label a case “unsuccessful,” we gathered evidence on whether the project 
was discontinued due to poor implementation, excessive cost, or sheer inadequacy (i.e. it was not 
a viable solution to the target problem).  In some cases, we were also able to gather data on the 
outcomes of the project, compared to regional or national data.   
Table 1 presents a description of our cases and a summary of evidence indicating whether 
the case is successful or unsuccessful.  When describing the cases of failure, we do not identify 
the name of the project or specific location where it was implemented.  This was a condition set 
by some interviewees to release more specific, sensitive information.  A more detailed 
description of the cases, however, is available upon request.1   
<Table 1 around here> 
Method 
Given the number of cases, it would be difficult to qualitatively describe and synthesize 
our findings.  At the same time, our number of cases is not sufficiently large for conventional 
regression analysis.  We thus used a configurational, set-theory approach in order to examine 
how distinct combinations of conditions are consistent with success in public initiatives (Fiss, 
2011; Ragin, 2006).  Specifically, we used fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), 
which employs Boolean algebra to find combinations of conditions consistent with each 
outcome.  In fsQCA, instead of coding the simple presence or absence of a condition, it is 
                                               
1 When describing the cases of failure, we do not identify the name of the project or specific location where it was 
implemented, only their state or province.  This was a condition set by some interviewees to release more specific, 
sensitive information.  Also, two cases in Brazil and South Africa mixed elements of bureaucratic services and urban 
development; they were classified as spanning these two areas. 
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possible to consider the degree to which a condition is present (e.g. the extent of collaboration or 
the extent of resource munificence).  Thus, fsQCA allows the researcher to examine not only 
conditions that will explain the occurrence of a phenomenon—i.e. if a case is successful (referred 
to as “fully in” in QCA jargon) or unsuccessful (“fully out”)—but also the extent to which each 
observation is consistent with success or failure. 
The fsQCA method has further advantages.  First, it accounts for equifinality, i.e. it 
accommodates situations where multiple paths can lead to the same outcome (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 
2008; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009).  Second, it allows for multiple combinations or configurations 
leading to positive or negative results.  These features are crucial for our research question, given 
that we intend to examine not only how distinct forms of collaboration can lead to superior social 
value, but also how multiple forms of collaboration can be combined in the same project (i.e. 
plurality). Following previous research in management (e.g. Bell, Filatotchev, and Aguilera, 
2014; Campbell, Sirmon, and Schijven, 2016), we use the configurations arising from our QCA 
analysis to reexamine existing theoretical links and even generate a new framework to be 
subsequently tested in future research.  
Data Collection  
 We collected data through qualitative interviews anchored on customized scales (rubrics) 
to measure our variables.  Our use of rubrics instead of agreement (Likert) scales is justified 
because we wanted to guarantee comparability across all responses. In our rubrics, we carefully 
described what each point in the scale meant for each item, thus anchoring responses on distinct 
types of behavior corresponding to different levels of the construct (Moskal, 2000; Oakleaf, 
2009).2 Dedicated research teams in each country, with deep understanding of the local context, 
                                               
2 For example, for the construct “public-public collaboration,” we measured the degree of collaboration through a 
range starting from the lowest level “1” indicating a situation where the initiative functions completely 
independently of other organizations in the public sector; and ending at the highest level “5” indicating the situation 
where operations were co-managed with other public units, in a system characterized by mutual interdependence 
and synergy. Our rubrics are not shown here but are available upon request. 
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performed the interviews and overall data collection.  In each project, they conducted three 
interviews with public officials or managers of private organizations that conceived or 
implemented the project.  The selection of multiple interviewees allowed us to mitigate common 
respondent bias and check the reliability of their assessments.  Each interview lasted at least one 
hour; in total, our whole interviewing process took about 72 hours in total, not considering the 
field trips and additional interviews required to validate all the cases.  The interviews were 
conducted in person or by phone/internet calls.  Besides collecting coded information following 
our rubrics, we also gathered qualitative assessments of how the project was executed and 
explanations of the dynamics that drove its final outcomes.  This procedure allowed us to 
triangulate our quantitative and qualitative data and provide an in-depth view of each initiative 
and its context (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). 
 After completing the set of three interviews for each of the 24 cases, we performed 
reliability tests to ensure consistency within cases as well as agreement across interviewees for 
the same case.  First, we computed the Cronbach Alpha to check the internal consistency of the 
interview results.   Second, we performed Kappa agreement tests against the null hypothesis that 
responses across raters were randomly determined (Fleiss, Levin, and Paik, 2003).  All cases 
show Alphas higher than the acceptable threshold of 0.7, and in all cases the corresponding p 
values allow us to reject the null hypothesis that response scores are randomly chosen.  We thus 
conclude that there was high agreement across our distinct raters.   
Outcome Measure: Evidence of Social Impact   
            As described in the previous section on case selection, we built a set of successful and 
unsuccessful cases based on existing evidence of impact (outcomes above what would have 
probably happened without the project).  Evidence of impact is thus an empirical 
operationalization of the social value created by the public initiative (see Table 1).  In this sense, 
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our outcome variable is a binary indicator of whether a particular case is considered a success 
(i.e. with evidence of impact) or failure.    
Measures of Collaboration 
            In our analysis of public service collaboration, we focused on three main forms of 
collaboration, namely: public-private, public-nonprofit, and public-public.  For each type of 
partner (a for-profit firm, a nonprofit organization, or another unit within the public 
bureaucracy), we relied on two questions coding whether the public agency responsible for the 
project i) effectively collaborated with the partner, and ii) recruited/engaged people from the 
partner to work on the project.  The second item was particularly designed to capture a potential 
cross-fertilization of capabilities across partners in the public domain (Cabral, Lazzarini, and 
Azevedo, 2013; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, and Pitelis, 2013).  As discussed before, each item 
had a specific rubric indicating what we meant by each point on the 1-5 scale.  For each 
collaboration type, we then calculated the average of those two items.  We thus arrived at three 
composite measures for each collaboration type: public-private, public-nonprofit, and public-
public; their Cronbach Alphas were respectively 0.70, 0.85 and 0.71, all above or equal to the 
acceptable threshold level of 0.70.  
Contextual Factors 
We also gathered data on additional conditions that can affect project outcomes and 
facilitate or hinder the adoption of certain types of collaboration.  Following Moore (1995), we 
consider two sets of conditions related to the operational capacity of the public organization as 
well as its surrounding environment.  These conditions are detailed below.  
Operational Capacity.  We also use rubric items to measure the ability of the public unit 
responsible for the project to lead and coordinate action towards the intended results.  Public 
administration scholars have underscored the importance of effective leadership to design and 
guarantee support for new programs (Hennessey, 1998; Fernandez and Rainey, 2006).  Acting as 
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change agents, project leaders connect ideas, personnel, and resources centered on a well-defined 
vision of what needs to be done (Consedine, Lewis, and Alexander, 2009; Kemp, Funk, and 
Eadie, 1993).3  In addition, we measured the extent of execution capabilities of the public unit, 
expressed as a set of resources and managerial practices leading to effective implementation and 
high-level accountability.  In particular, we tried to gauge whether the public bureaucracy 
recruited highly skilled and professional staff (Miller, 2000; Borins, 2001; Bhatti, Olsen, and 
Pedersen, 2011), adopted mechanisms to monitor performance and curb corruption (Barzeley 
and Armajani, 1992; Parker and Gould, 1999; Klarner, Probst, and Soparnot, 2008; Cabral and 
Lazzarini, 2015), and incentivized its personnel to achieve high performance (Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2010; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).4   
Environment Contingencies.  The environment plays a critical role in influencing the 
performance of public service initiatives (Damanpour and Schneider, 2009) and public 
collaborations (Andrews and Entwitle, 2010).  First, in line with the management literature (e.g. 
Dess and Beard, 1984), we assess whether governments were affected by the degree of resource 
munificence in the environment, assessed in terms of human, financial, and infrastructure 
resources.5  For instance, Bhatti, Olsen, and Pedersen (2011) show that municipalities with better 
access to financial resources are more likely to adopt new innovations.  In addition, following 
                                               
3 We measured project leadership based on four items, coding the extent to which the project leader i) had a clear 
vision for the initiative and the ability to clearly articulate its goals; ii) provided proactive strategic and operational 
oversight; iii) communicated internally and externally the performance of the project; and iv) allowed ideas and 
solutions to emerge “bottom-up”, from the public organization (Cronbach Alpha = 0.90). 
4 Our measured items asked the extent to which public managers i) had up-to-date formal training in their areas of 
expertise; ii) were selected based on rigorous technical criteria instead of political; iii) were allocated to dedicated 
units to run the project; iv) were rewarded based on their performance; v) monitored key performance indicators 
(KPIs), budget controls, and time controls; vi) received support to adapt to new process under the project; and vii) 
created practices to control potential corruption (Cronbach Alpha = 0.92).  Because these items appear to cover a 
broad range of constructs (such as monitoring and incentives), we also ran factor analyses to see if these items could 
be split into more specialized measures.  However, likelihood-ratio tests consistently revealed that the single-factor 
model significantly outperforms the model with two or more factors.  In all rubrics, respondents were explicitly 
asked to provide their assessments of the project as at the time of design and implementation. 
5 We measured munificence as the degree of access the project had to three sets of critical resources: i) human 
capital recruited for the project; ii) infrastructure (physical and technology); and iii) financial capital in the 
municipality (Cronbach Alpha = 0.83). 
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discussions in political economy (Persson and Tabellini, 2002), we assessed whether the political 
context for each project was subject to frequent changes in the ruling political party—a factor 
that can undermine project implementation and continuity.  Thus, we measured political stability 
by asking respondents to indicate their perception of whether a change in public administration 
would scrap initiatives implemented by previous teams.     
Calibration and Thresholds 
Before running the analysis, we calibrated our data by converting all variables to a scale 
ranging from 0 to 1.  Following the fsQCA methodology, we also defined intermediary points in 
the data.  First, we built the raw database using the median term of each group of questions 
measuring the same construct (Bell, Filatotchev, and Aguilera, 2014; Judge, Fainshmidt, and Lee 
Brown III, 2014).  Second, considering the scores for each variable in the raw database, we 
generated a quartile split of the entire sample.  We arrived at the following values: 1.00 
representing full membership; 0.67, mostly membership; and 0.33, mostly non-membership and 
0, full non-membership. This calibration improves our assessment of the differences among 
cases (Crilly, 2011; Judge et al., 2014), and avoids the definiition of arbitrary intermediate points 
which can potentially lead to estimation error (Maggetti and Levi-Faur, 2013; Ragin, 2008; 
Rihoux and Ragin, 2009).  As for the outcome variable, we followed a crisp-set calibration (Fiss, 
2007, 2011; Ragin, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009) by classifying cases as either successful or 
unsuccessful (as explained earlier).  Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations 
among our variables. 
<Table 2 around here> 
After calibration, we defined the consistency and frequency thresholds for the fsQCA.  
Consistency refers to the degree to which membership in a particular configuration is a subset of 
membership in the final outcome (Ragin, 2006).  In simple terms, high consistency means that a 
certain combination of conditions tends to be associated with the outcome of interest (in our 
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case, evidence of positive impact).  When defining a target level of consistency, we sought a 
conservative level of 0.800 (Bell et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2016; Fiss, 2007, 2011), though 
0.750 can be considered acceptable (Ragin, 2006).  As for the frequency threshold, based on the 
technical literature (Maggetti and Levi-Faur, 2013; Ragin, 2008), we pursued a more 
parsimonious set of configurations having correspondence to our observed cases—that is, we 
ignored the so called “logical reminders,” which are essentially plausible but lack representation 
in the data.  Given our relatively small sample size, we followed the recommendation by Rihoux 
and Ragin (2009: 107) and considered configurations with at least one representative case.   
RESULTS: CONFIGURATIONS AND CASE ILLUSTRATIONS 
Table 3 presents the results involving sufficient and necessary conditions for social value 
creation (evidence of positive impact) in public service initiatives.  Overall, results report 
consistent solution configurations, above our defined consistency threshold of 0.8 (except for the 
second configuration, which is slightly below this threshold but still at an acceptable level; e.g. 
Ragin, 2006).  Furthermore, our revealed configurations account for more than 61% of the sum 
of membership scores in the outcome (Ragin, 2006), a result that can be considered satisfactory 
(Bell et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2016).  We consider only solutions with unique 
configurations, totaling four distinct combinations of conditions.  Following Fiss (2011), we use 
black circles ("●") to indicate the presence of a condition, and crossed-out circles ("") to 
indicate its absence.  Blank spaces indicate an immaterial (“don’t care”) situation, that is, the 
presence or absence of the condition is not relevant to the solution.   
<Table 3 around here> 
Before describing the role of distinct types and combinations of collaboration—the focus 
of our paper—we note a robust pattern that we found in our analysis: the two variables coding 
public operational capacity (leadership and execution capabilities) are present in all four 
solutions.  Thus, they can be considered as necessary conditions for social value creation in our 
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setting.  The pervasive effect of effective leadership recurs across our successful case studies. 
For example, we saw the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh play a crucial role in the successful 
eSeva electronic kiosk project and also in the creation of the Water Supply and Sewerage Board, 
both projects in Hyderabad, India. His distinctive contributions included finding and bringing 
together relevant people and departments from diverse parts of the public bureaucracy; as well as 
an insistence on effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms, which proved essential in 
achieving efficient outcomes and avoiding corruption.  Consider, for instance, the following 
quote from the Water Supply and Sewerage Board initiative in Hyderabad: 
 
They [political leaders] made a list of the kind of people they needed. IT people, 
organization people, management people and accountancy people and then they went 
looking for talent. They managed to get a good people and it was a systematic exercise 
(sector specialist in India, pers. comm.). 
Although leadership and execution capabilities appear to act as necessary conditions for 
social value creation, they are not sufficient; our revealed fsQCA solutions involve a host of 
simultaneous conditions, including distinct types of collaboration.  Our first solution—consistent 
with positive impact—involves a single type of collaboration, public-public. This solution is 
characterized by the absence of any alliance with for-profit firms, whereas the existence of 
public-nonprofit alliances is not material to achieving the positive impact.  Solution 1a shows 
that public-public collaboration alone can be consistent with positive impact but only under very 
favorable contextual conditions—namely, environments with high political stability and high 
resource munificence.  An example in our set of cases is Cape Town’s MyCiti BRT, in South 
Africa.  The project was initially conceived by the National Department of Transportation to 
support the activities of the 2010 World Soccer Cup.  The transportation agency in the 
municipality was responsible for mobilizing multiple public units and employees, including 
public transportation authorities, engineering agencies, bus operators, and universities. The 
importance of public-public collaboration appears in the following quote: 
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If you look at any project, if you don’t have Treasury on board, it’s unlikely you will have 
too much success because they hold the money. The involvement of Treasury, and 
actively making the resources available are extremely important…  In terms of the skills, 
I think that was a good level of human capital within the project team, with very 
experienced people. Not only skills in terms of engineering, no; [but also in terms of] 
how to work within local government, national, with big major infrastructure projects 
(sector specialist in South Africa, pers. comm.)  
The quote above illustrates the importance of public-public collaboration, and it also 
underlines the value of having an adequate pool of physical and human resources available in the 
public bureaucracy—i.e. a condition of high resource munificence.   The project also had access 
to sufficient funding from public sources. The National Treasury Department supported this 
project as a national initiative in close partnership with the local transport authority. At the same 
time, the initiative benefitted from a context of high political stability.  The local government 
remained with the same party from 2006 to 2013, spanning the entire implementation period of 
the project (2007-2010).    
Like solution 1a, solutions 1b and 1c also reveal the importance of public-public 
collaboration. But they uncover that combining public-public collaboration with public-nonprofit 
collaboration can result in success even when environmental conditions are not very positive.  
Specifically, we see positive impact when these two collaboration types coexist, in a moderately 
favorable environmental context characterized by either high resource munificence or high 
political stability, not necessarily both.  Thus, solution 1b shows that public-nonprofit 
collaborations complement public-public ties when the environmental favorability stems from 
the presence of high political stability (i.e., resource munificence may or may not be present).  
An example is Poupatempo, the “one-stop shop” unit in Sao Paulo, Brazil, discussed earlier: 
 
Collaboration across diverse public agencies was a sine qua non condition for the 
success of Poupatempo. As we recruited people from diverse public agencies, these 
agencies would either collaborate, or otherwise we would make the project happen 
(former manager of Poupatempo who led the project, pers. comm.). 
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Yet Poupatempo’s public managers also relied on partnerships with nonprofits, such as 
the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), a Brazilian think-tank and school that provided the 
government with technical analyses and advice.  These collaborations occurred in a context of 
high political stability.  The State of São Paulo has been run by the same political party since 
1995; and during 1995-2002, the federal government was controlled by a coalition led by that 
same party.  When the first Poupatempo unit was implemented, in 1997, the mayor of the city of 
São Paulo was from a political party that was also part of the federal coalition.  This political 
alignment also helped the replication of Poupatempo in other municipalities.   
Solution 1c is similar to the second configuration (1b), as it also involves the presence of 
both public-public and public-nonprofit collaboration.  However, solution 1c requires the 
absence of public-private collaboration and the presence of high resource munificence. The 
presence of political stability is immaterial. For example, we examined the Andhra Pradesh 
Teacher Performance Pay project in India as one of our successful cases.  Focused on primary 
education, the program implemented performance-contingent compensation to incentivize 
teachers and schools.  Specifically, teachers and schools were provided with bonuses tied to the 
evolution of student learning assessed through independent exams.  The State of Andhra 
Pradesh, with a level of per capita income slightly above the national average, mobilized 
resources from its education system and helped fund some activities, with support from the 
World Bank and from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID).  That is, 
while political stability supported the implementation and expansion of Poupatempo, the Andhra 
Pradesh project benefitted from improved resource munificence in the form of funding and skills 
from a variety of external sources. In addition, the government worked with a complex network 
of nonprofit partners, including Vidya (a charity hiring volunteers to help vulnerable 
communities) and the Azim Premji Foundation (a nonprofit specialized in primary education):  
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The World Bank brought in resources from The Department of International 
Development (DFID) and channeled them through the Azim Premji Foundation with the 
full blessing of the state government. The State of Andhra Pradesh put in 2 crores [twenty 
million] rupees into the study on top of which they also provided 100 Vidya volunteers to 
schools that had been identified as a part of the study. The Azim Premji Foundation 
(APF) brought in a core team of about 10 people. There were about 30 staff that APF 
had brought on board to maintain relationships with the schools by doing a tracking 
survey every month. They were provided training on a regular basis by the APF (senior 
economist at the World Bank, pers. comm.).  
Finally, solution 1d is the only one where public-private collaboration is present, jointly 
with public-nonprofit collaboration.  This configuration also involves high political stability and 
an absence of munificent resources; this solution thus differs from configuration 1b, where 
political stability is required but munificence is immaterial.  An example from our case studies is 
the Siyakha Nentsha project (translated as “building with young people”), an education program 
for teenagers in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province.  The project involved developing 
extracurricular skills among young students, with the particular objective of teaching them how 
to mitigate threats from HIV/AIDS—whose incidence in this region of South Africa is 
particularly high.  The project was implemented in coordination with nonprofit organizations, 
specifically, the Population Council and Isihlangu HDA. These nonprofits worked with the 
Department of Education to offer specialized education programs for HIV prevention.  Public-
private collaboration, in turn, came through the activities of AccuData, a for-profit firm 
specialized in data and research solutions. AccuData and the Population Council closely 
interacted on important technical activities, as evidenced by the following quote:  
 
AccuData was chosen as partner because of their vast expertise in successfully 
organizing and managing social science research within traditional communities in 
southern Africa… Isihlangu HDA certainly had the local knowledge, and Pop Council 
had the technical expertise for the survey data collection, but neither organization had 
the combination described above that was required to work in the peri-urban and rural 
communities where the project took place (Population Council manager, pers. comm.).  
The project was executed in a context of low resource munificence.  KwaZulu-Natal is in 
a poor region of South Africa, where most families are subsistence farmers and have poor access 
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to quality education and infrastructure.  However, the project benefitted from high political 
stability.  The province is an area of Zulu communities, with enduring social norms and 
interactions.  Between 2004 and 2009, a period covering most of the project’s implementation, 
KwaZulu-Natal was run by the same Premier and his successor was from the same party.  
To finalize, it is also informative to examine combinations consistent with failure.  One 
of the premises of QCA analysis is that configurations leading to success are not necessarily the 
opposite of configurations leading to failure; that is, there is asymmetry in the conditions 
affecting positive and negative outcomes. As seen in Table 4, except for configuration 2f, all 
“failed solutions” involve the absence of either leadership or execution capability, which 
reinforces our previous finding that these factors seem to represent baseline conditions to support 
successful project implementation.  As configurations 2a-2d show, the absence of leadership and 
execution capability is a common characteristic of failed solutions, even when different hybrids 
are present.  Interestingly, these factors are immaterial in configuration 2f, but in this solution we 
see the complete absence of all forms of collaboration as well as political stability. 
It is also interesting to note that cases of failure tend to be associated with single 
(nonplural) public-nonprofit or public-private collaborations (2a-2c); or, alternatively, with the 
absence of at least one form of collaboration (2e-2g).  The only solution leading to failure 
involving plural collaboration is the fourth (2d).  In this configuration, we observe the absence of 
public-public collaboration and execution capabilities, whereas leadership and resource 
munificence may or may not be present.  Therefore, our empirical analysis reveals that cases of 
plural collaboration are more frequently associated with successful than unsuccessful outcomes.  
However, we also find that collaboration per se is not sufficient to generate impact, as it requires 
the presence of other important conditions—notably, leadership and execution capability. 
<Table 4 around here> 
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DISCUSSION: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK ON PLURAL 
COLLABORATIONS  
In light of our empirical findings, we now inductively propose a new theoretical 
framework on the emergence of plural collaborations in the context of public initiatives and 
especially mechanisms leading to their complementary (synergistic) effects.  Table 5 summarizes 
our revealed configurations and proposed mechanisms.  Based on our theoretical discussion 
earlier, our analysis is based on two key factors influencing the synergistic effect of plural 
hybrids: resource complementarity (the ability of actors to bring valuable, complementary 
resources) and legitimacy (whether the proposed collaboration is aligned with public and 
stakeholder norms).  We also propose that the complementary effect of multiple, plural 
collaborations is contextual: distinct traits of the local environment will influence the perceived 
benefits (and risks) of different hybrids (and hybrids of hybrids) in terms of resource 
mobilization and legitimacy.    
A common contextual condition, irrespective of the type of collaboration, involves the 
existence of superior public operational capacity, as a mix of public leadership and execution 
capabilities.  For collaborations to work and lead to successful initiatives, they first need the full 
engagement of political leaders who can help legitimize the project and define a common vision 
guiding the mobilization of public and private resources (e.g. Consedine, Lewis, and Alexander, 
2009; Kemp, Funk, and Eadie, 1993).  Although this is not a particularly novel argument—
Moore (1995), for instance, has long emphasized the importance of public operational capacity 
to promote social value—it does indicate that collaborations do not simply supplant or substitute 
for the lack of effective government action.  However, this statement should not imply that the 
absence of operational capacity is sufficient for failure; our previous analysis showed that 
unsuccessful outcomes are usually associated not only with low operational capacity, but also 
with a host of additional and diverse conditions.  
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<Table 5 around here> 
If superior operational capacity is present, then environmental conditions will come into 
play.  Our results show that successful cases always involve the presence of either high resource 
munificence or high political stability.  Consider the first successful configuration (solution 1a), 
involving both resource munificence and political stability.  This is the only case where we 
observe simple, non-plural public-public collaboration.  With high availability of financial, 
human, and physical resources, governments may not necessarily need to outsource key activities 
to tap into external inputs and knowledge.  Furthermore, external collaboration may be seen as 
illegitimate, because governments have the capacity to operate value-creating projects using their 
own resources.  If governments engage external actors, they may face public criticism that they 
are “privatizing” services that are supposed to be state-run, or simply transferring public 
resources to selected individuals and organizations  (Dahl and Soss, 2014).  Interestingly, 
solution 1a requires the absence of public-private collaboration, suggesting that this threat to 
legitimacy is particularly acute in the case of firms with profit-based objectives.  High political 
stability, in turn, facilitates the continuous mobilization of internal resources and institutionalizes 
collaborative public action.  With a highly stable political environment, the public bureaucracy 
will tend to preserve technical pockets of specialized personnel (Schneider, 1991) and create 
expectations of a longer-term interaction among public actors, supporting the development of 
repeated, relational collaborative ties (Bertelli and Smith, 2010). 
Solution 1b occurs in an environment where political stability is high but resource 
munificence is not guaranteed—it can be either high or low. A stable political environment 
supports the internal mobilization of public resources and the creation of public-public ties.  
However, because resource munificence is not necessarily present, internal efforts can be 
complemented by the external involvement of nonprofits and the diverse resources they possess.  
In our previous discussion of theory, we argued that nonprofits often have a comparative 
 26 
 
advantage in important dimensions of public service, such as specialized knowledge of target 
beneficiaries, skills to communicate with local communities, or extra financial resources to 
support interventions (e.g. Gazley and Brudney, 2007).  In addition, the involvement of 
nonprofits reduces legitimacy concerns, given that they are less financially-motivated and more 
mission-driven than private firms (Drucker, 1989; McDonald, 2007).  In solution 1b, however, 
we still expect that the role of the public actors will remain central to the design and delivery of 
the project—nonprofits will likely contribute with specialized knowledge and skills that 
complement the activities of their public-public partners.     
When resource munificence is high but political stability is not necessarily present, we 
again see a plural combination of public-public and public-nonprofit collaboration, but with the 
absence of relevant ties with for-profit firms.  If the political environment happens to be stable, 
public-public ties can be promoted and developed over time, with a positive impact on the 
government's ability to mobilize internal resources.  However, in this configuration, political 
stability is not guaranteed.  If changes in policy can destabilize internal public collaboration, 
nonprofits can complement public-public ties in at least two important ways.  First, nonprofits 
can create embedded ties with members of the public bureaucracy (McDermott, Corredoira, and 
Kruse, 2009), helping represent the interests of potential beneficiaries and promoting the 
continuity of value-creating initiatives.  Second, nonprofits can act as more stable and consistent 
repositories of specialized knowledge, thereby facilitating the accumulation of information and 
experience. In this solution, nonprofits will tend to have a more prominent role, helping to 
execute key activities while still working with public-public ties to access government resources.  
Note again that high resource munificence reduces the legitimacy of for-profit private 
participation, thus leading governments to rely on the action of mission-oriented nonprofits.  
Finally, in solution 1d, we see social value being created through plural public-nonprofit 
and public-private collaborations, in a context of political stability and low resource munificence.  
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In fact, this is the only configuration where public ties with for-profit firms are consistent with 
positive impact.  As noted before, low resource munificence helps legitimize the participation of 
for-profit firms. These firms can bring extra capital for new investment, as well as proprietary 
technical knowledge and efficient execution capabilities (Cabral, Lazzarini, and Azevedo, 2013).  
At the same time, high political stability increases their willingness to deploy these distinct 
resources, since it reduces the risk of new administrations coming to power that might alter or 
terminate existing contracts (e.g. Kivleniece and Quelin, 2012; Moszoro and Spiller, 2012).  
However, the higher-powered incentives of for-profit firms may pose a risk to social value 
creation if they place excessive emphasis on economic gains at the expanse of social value.  The 
presence of mission-driven nonprofits can therefore help balance social and profit-oriented 
objectives during project design and implementation (Bennett and Iossa, 2009). 
Although we observe many instances of plural collaboration, social value creation does 
not appear to require the simultaneous presence of all three forms of collaboration.  A possible 
conjecture is that the cost and complexity of designing and governing such a web of alliances 
would be excessive.  For instance, if nonprofits bring distinctive resources and capabilities 
unavailable in the public sector, governments can avoid the cost of crafting complex contracts 
with for-profit firms to access the same resources and capabilities. And in doing so, they would 
also avoid the risk of damaging perceived legitimacy.  The total number of plural hybrids may 
also be tempered by the complex interplay between the alliance types and the environmental 
conditions.  For instance, in a context with low resource munificence but high political stability, 
we observe the presence of public-private and public-nonprofit collaborations, whereas the 
presence of public-public ties is not material to success.  In this case, while political stability can 
promote intragovernmental ties (as we argued before), it may also result in the development of 
distinct administrative bodies, specialized in project management and coordination, 
circumventing the need for different public bodies to each develop their own capacity to 
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collaborate.  This reinforces our assertion that the examination of internal conditions in the 
public bureaucracy is crucial to understand external collaborations with private actors. 
CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
In this paper, we advance the discussion of how social value can potentially emerge from 
the intertwined action of public and private actors.  Our fsQCA analysis reveals not only 
alternative configurations consistent with positive impact, but also solutions involving more than 
one type of collaboration—which we refer to as collaboration plurality.  Each unique 
combination also depends on a host of contextual conditions involving the operational capacity 
of the state as well as environmental factors influencing the value-creating ability of distinct 
forms of collaboration.  Our research brings important contributions, outlined below.     
Contributions 
Our analysis of multiple forms of collaboration enhances our understanding of how 
public-private hybrids work and affect social value.  Received theory has conceived public-
private hybrids as forms that mix elements of private markets and public bureaucracies; for 
instance, firms in traditional public-private partnerships are autonomous entities but are normally 
subject to strong public supervision (e.g. Cabral et al., 2010; Williamson, 1999).  However, 
while a cursory examination of collaborations in the public sector suggests multiple types of 
hybrid forms, the literature has tended to examine each single hybrid in isolation.  Even in the 
rare instances where scholars consider the effect of multiple types of alliances (e.g. Andrews and 
Entwitle, 2010), there is no consolidated discussion of how various hybrids can positively affect 
each other in the creation of social value.  We thus improve our understanding of how hybrid 
public collaborations work by studying the emergence of plural hybrids (or “hybrids of 
hybrids”), with a particular emphasis on their potential synergistic effects.  Our emphasis on 
plurality is consistent with previous research in strategic management studying the simultaneous 
presence of multiple arrangements to govern the same focal activity, such as in the case where 
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firms make and buy supply components (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ménard, 2013; Parmigiani, 
2007).  In our discussion, we unveil multiple channels through which various hybrids can 
complement one another and jointly promote social value.  No less important, we argue that their 
complementary effects are contextual, that is, they depend on key conditions influencing the 
perceived legitimacy and resource-based benefits of distinct collaborations.  For instance, we 
show that public-private collaborations tend to increase social value mostly in a condition of low 
resource munificence, which enhances the benefit and legitimacy of accessing valuable resources 
possessed by for-profit actors. 
Although our findings confirm the importance of external collaboration with nonprofit 
and for-profit private firms, our discussion highlights the equally important role of internal 
collaboration across different parts of the public sector (Andrews and Entwitle, 2010; Cabral and 
Krane, Forthcoming) and of public operational capabilities (Moore, 1995).  Public-public 
collaboration is found to be relevant in many configurations consistent with superior social 
value.  We thus advance our understanding of the interaction between external and internal 
hybrids, the latter defined as collaborative efforts across relatively autonomous public units.  We 
also find that hybrid collaborations are not sufficient to generate social value; they require the 
presence of public operational capacity, which has long been discussed in public administration 
(Miller, 2000; Moore, 1995).  Therefore, a movement towards greater private sector participation 
in public initiatives and intense utilization of cross-sector resources—referred to as 
“externalization” (Alford and O'Flynn, 2012)— requires more, not less, capability within the 
public sector to lead and execute value-creating activities.  This point also has significant 
practical implications, as several governments have tried to stimulate various types of public-
private arrangements throughout the world (Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic, 2014).  Public 
capabilities seem to be critical for the performance of those collaborative endeavors even if they 
are largely executed by private actors.  Our assertion of the importance of improving public 
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sector capabilities (whether around leadership or execution) calls for greater cooperation 
between scholars of strategic management and public administration. Their independent efforts 
to understand the value-creating potential of public and private interactions would benefit from 
the cross-fertilization of one another’s ideas.     
Our emphasis on cases with evidence of positive impact can also be adopted in future 
studies assessing the determinants and performance implications of public initiatives.  Our 
empirical operationalization of social value creation is based on the notion of social impact, 
where the outcome of a given project is evaluated in comparison to a counterfactual scenario 
assessing what would have happened to the target population if the project were not implemented 
in the first place.  Our stringent criterion for the inclusion of cases deemed as successful is 
aligned with recent academic work calling for more rigorous assessment of impact (Duflo, 
Glennerster, and Kremer, 2008; Kroeger and Weber, 2014) as well as applied discussions 
emphasizing the importance of isolating extraneous factors that may incorrectly lead to the 
impression that a given project was successful (Donaldson, Christie, and Mark, 2015).       
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 Our chosen method, fsQCA, allowed for the systematic assessment of conditions in a 
restricted set of cases, in order to inductively generate a new theoretical framework on how 
plural collaboration might affect social value creation.  Future research could also try to 
statistically test the relevance of our conditions using a larger number of cases.  Although it may 
be difficult to gather a large number of instances of positive impact, researchers could identify 
heterogeneous conditions associated with each case.  Suppose, for instance, that data on micro-
level outcomes (e.g. at the individual or family level) are available for a given project of public 
service innovation.  Then researchers could look for differences in the implementation of the 
project, possibly associated with heterogeneity in the strength or effectiveness of collaborations, 
as well as differences in environmental conditions (e.g. poorer versus richer regions).          
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 Scholars can also delve into the details of each collaboration type, as well as the 
functioning of all plural modes identified in our research.  Consider Makadok and Coff’s (2009) 
theory of hybrids based on three dimensions: authority, incentives, and ownership.  Thus, private 
(for-profit or nonprofit) firms collaborating with governments may totally or partially own 
relevant assets (Bennett and Iossa, 2006); receive contingent payments based on exchange 
outcomes (Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011); and exhibit varying degrees of autonomy 
depending on the extent of regulation or supervision (Williamson, 1999).  Future research can 
not only identify various forms of collaboration, but also measure in more detail how each type 
can be described as a combination of ownership, authority, incentives, and relational traits.     
 Expanding the range of sectors and countries with successful public innovations is also a 
promising avenue for future research.  For instance, scholars could examine the impact of 
collaborations on large infrastructure projects requiring massive capital expenditures, as well as 
initiatives in a broader range of emerging and developed countries.  An improved institutional 
framework, with stronger checks-and-balances against discretionary regulation and corruption, 
can create a more stable setting for private investment and external collaboration with private 
firms; but it can also increase the efficiency of public bureaucracies, thereby facilitating the 
emergence of multiple internal public-public collaborations.  Studying plural collaboration 
across a more diverse set of institutional settings may reveal even more complexity and insights 
into how these hybrids of hybrids work and affect social value creation.       
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Table 1. Description of Cases and their Outcomes 
Sector and 
location 
Cases of successful social value creation Cases of failure 
Description Why it is a success (evidence of impact) Description* Why it is a failure 
Education, 
Brazil 
“Sobral Education Program”: Initiative 
implemented in 2001 to improve the quality 
of primary education in the municipality of 
Sobral.   
The proportion of students falling behind their regular school year 
decreased from 57.5% to 2% between 2000 and 2014. The outcomes of 
standardized learning assessment tests showed that students in the city 
improved their learning in Portuguese and Mathematics above 
comparable students in other cities, using propensity score matching 
(Rocha, Komatsu, and Menezes Filho, 2015) 
Project to implement new IT devices in 
schools aimed at improving learning and 
digital inclusion. 
The IT devices were discontinued a few years 
after their implementation. The equipment 
was assessed as unused and obsolete three 
years after acquisition. 
Education, 
India 
“Andhra Pradesh Teacher Performance Pay 
Initiative”: the purpose of the project, 
implemented between 2004 and 2007, was 
to improve the quality of primary education 
through incentives (pay for performance) to 
teachers 
Two years after the program had been implemented, the test scores of 
students were higher in the schools with the incentive system, compared 
to other schools in the same state without the incentive system. To build 
the treated and control groups, the assessment study used a randomized 
controlled trial design (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011; Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman, 2011). 
Program to improve education indicators 
(grades, dropouts), and healthcare 
indicators (nutritional needs). 
In more than 80% of the centers that received 
the program, there was scarcity of equipment 
like weighing scales, education kits, and toys.  
In 44% of the centers, none of the enrolled 
children were found attending pre-schools.  
Education, 
South Africa 
“KwaZulu-Natal - Siyakha Nentsha”: 
school-based life-skills program for 
teenagers, to mitigate the threats of 
HIV/AIDS in the KwaZulu-Natal province, 
between 2008 and 2012. 
Different sets of programs were implemented: (1) a control group 
received standard life orientation; (2) a treatment group received an 
enhanced package of education focused on social skills; and (3) another 
treatment group received the same enhanced package plus education to 
develop financial skills. Compared to the control group, the teenagers 
reported more responsible sexual behavior as well as higher propensity 
to save money and other positive behaviors (Hallman et al, 2012). 
The program provided refurbished 
computers to schools, funding all costs 
of connection. The initiative involved the 
establishment of an operational cyberlab 
at the school to be used for education and 
the development of ICT skills. 
The lab became inactive soon after its launch, 
due to a lack of dedicated personnel and 
planning. The computers were not used and 
the technology rapidly became obsolete.  
Bureaucratic 
Services, 
Brazil 
“São Paulo Poupatempo”: one-stop shop 
launched in 1997 to consolidate several 
services and bureaucratic processes 
involved in the issuance of official 
documents to citizens. 
A study compared the time spent by individuals issuing documents in 
cities with and without Poupatempo (Fredriksson, 2015).  Using 
differences-in-differences analysis (i.e. changes in outcomes in the two 
groups before and after the introduction of Poupatempo), the study 
found a 29% reduction in the time spent obtaining a driver’s license 
compared to the regular service provided by a state unit in the period 
2008-2010. 
Project to provide portable GPS-enabled 
electronic devices to support the work of 
municipal civil engineering inspection 
teams.  
The government shut down the program 
before its implementation, but after significant 
investment had been made in software 
development, hardware acquisition, and 
training. 
Bureaucratic 
Services, 
India 
“Hyderabad e-Seva”: Roll-out of electronic 
kiosks, launched in 1997, to support service 
transactions in both rural and urban areas.  
Kiosks offer public services and facilitate 
transactions with private firms (payment of 
phone bills, for example). 
A study showed that the program benefitted citizens through reduced 
travel costs and waiting times vis-à-vis the traditional manual service. 
For instance, waiting times at manual service centers were on average 
32.9 minutes, compared to 14.5 at the e-kiosks (Bhatnagar et al, 2007). 
ICT devices offered at kiosks in villages 
to provide centralized and easy access to 
citizen services. 
Out of the 36 kiosks that opened between 
2001 and 2004, only 4 remained operational 
by 2005. 
Bureaucratic 
Services/ 
Urban 
Planning, 
South Africa 
“Polokwane Settlement Program": Starting 
in 2004, this initiative involved the 
coordination and centralization of multiple 
services related to housing, water and 
sanitation, electricity, health, and education. 
The project involved the relocation of 
citizens from slum dwellings to a new 
settlement, with formal home ownership. 
The new settlements brought tangible improvements to the dwelling 
structures, improved access to services (electricity, water, health), and 
lower crime rates. The population attained benefits from formal land 
ownership, including the raised likelihood of receiving loans from 
banks and higher investment in home upgrades. These gains were 
assessed in comparison to the previous settlement which lacked 
consolidated services (serving as control group). Half the population of 
the informal settlement remained in the area, due to lack of available 
land (Martinez, Legovini, Krishnan, and Coville, 2011). 
The program aimed to centralize 
municipal billing databases, replacing 
multiple, disparate IT systems, to 
improve the accuracy and completeness 
of the billing and invoicing processes, as 
well as improving collection and service 
quality. 
It took twice the expected time to complete 
implementation (five years). Problems with 
service infrastructure lead to 41,000 
disconnections and massive numbers of 
citizen complaints. These problems persisted 
after project implementation.  
Public 
Transport, 
Brazil 
“Curitiba BRT System”: A Bus Rapid 
Transport system (BRT) with capacity to 
accommodate more passengers at higher 
speeds. The busways were structured in a 
Compared to regular bus systems, the new BRT system achieved higher 
average speeds, greater passenger capacity, and improved frequency.  A 
study in 2009, for instance, found that the average speed was 49% 
higher in the BRT system compared to regular bus lines (NTU, 2009).  
“Cycle lanes”: The program built 
dedicated lanes for bicycles across a 
large city,  complemented by 
The cycle lanes suffered from design 
problems, construction problems and poor 
planning and coordination with existing 
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Sector and 
location 
Cases of successful social value creation Cases of failure 
Description Why it is a success (evidence of impact) Description* Why it is a failure 
corridor format, crossing through central 
areas of the city. The project started in the 
1970s but was substantially expanded 
thereafter.  
comprehensive education policies to 
control traffic and reduce speed limits. 
transport infrastructure. Usage and 
satisfaction levels are very low. 
Public 
Transport, 
India 
“New Delhi Metro”: metro system 
providing a cost-effective and 
environmentally friendly alternative to 
existing public transport.  The metro, whose 
construction started in 1995, eased the 
growing pressure on the existing, over-
crowded road network. 
The metro system reduced the number of vehicles on the streets. 
Furthermore, comparisons with the metro system in another large Indian 
city showed Delhi Metro with a substantially lower cost per kilometer 
and with higher rates of return on investment (25,8% versus 13,4%) 
(Ramachandran, 2012). 
Launched in 2006, the program aimed to 
build a Bus Rapid Transport system to 
upgrade the dilapidated bus 
infrastructure, to alleviate over-crowded 
roads and to complement a new metro 
system. 
Average travel times actually increased (by 
15.7 minutes), and  the project suffered a 
financial loss of US$ 36 million per year. A 
survey indicated that citizen satisfaction 
decreased from 3.53 (considered as average-
good) to 2.54 (bad-average). 
Public 
Transport, 
South Africa 
“Cape Town BRT System”: creation of a 
bus rapid transport system, in part to 
support the FIFA World Cup Finals, but 
also to provide safe, reliable and affordable 
transport to citizens. Construction started in 
2007.  
Although no existing impact assessment was found, we used a survey 
measuring citizen feedback on the BRT conducted in 2014. The survey 
included questions about previously available transport alternatives as 
well as comparisons with current transport options. The BRT scores 
higher than the alternatives on the many features measured, including 
value for money, quality, punctuality, comfort and safety. 
Project with the objective of providing 
an integrated transport system to support 
a large city that was about to host a large 
international event. 
The buses that were acquired for the system 
remained unused after the event. The project 
resulted in substantial losses due to financial 
irregularities and under-utilized assets. 
Urban 
Planning/ 
Bureaucratic 
Services, 
Brazil 
“Osasco Land Titling Regularization”: 
Starting in 2005, the program assigned 
housing property rights to disadvantaged 
populations through the coordinated 
distribution of formal land titles in illegally-
occupied urban areas. 
The program had a positive effect on labour supply (hours worked) of 
individuals in the target communities, compared to control groups. The 
results indicated that individuals could allocate more time to work 
instead of spending time protecting their belongings (Moura, Piza, 
Poplawski-Ribeiro, 2011) 
Urban planning project to transfer all city 
electricity cables underground and 
remove the electricity poles. Objectives 
included the lowering of maintenance 
costs and improving the urban landscape 
of the city. 
While the initial project set an initial target of 
250 kilometers of cable to be buried in each 
year and an estimated completion time of no 
longer than five years, project execution was 
well below target and conclusion is not 
expected within 24 years. 
Urban 
Planning, 
India 
“Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board”: The program improved 
the overall quality of water supply and 
sewerage treatment in a fast-growing Indian 
city. Initiated in 1989, the program was 
implemented through the 1990s. 
An evaluation of the program before and after it was implemented 
pointed to the reduction in time spent on complaint redressals. Other 
benefits included improved accessibility, affordability and 
simplification of the process of attaining new plumbing connections. 
Compared to a comparable city, the Hyderabad service was found to be 
cheaper and less likely to encounter pipe breakages (Kamalanathan, nd). 
Project to provide affordable and 
appropriate housing to slum residents 
through a rehousing program that 
improves living conditions. 
The implementation of the project began 
seven years after it was approved. The cost of 
the project almost tripled from the initial 
proposal, and several phases and procedures 
were never accomplished as planned. 
Urban 
Planning, 
South Africa 
“eThekwini Water and Sanitation”: The 
initiative brought potable water and 
sanitation facilities to a low-income 
metropolitan area that had practically none. 
The program started in the mid 1990s. 
An assessment of the outcomes of the project before and after it was 
implemented indicated an increase in total water-supply connections, 
beyond levels observed in other cities during the same period. In fact, it 
was the only municipality out of 14 in the same area that was assessed 
to not be water vulnerable (Mussa, 2015).  
Initiative to replace the old infrastructure 
for electricity services. The goal was to 
reduce energy usage through more 
accurate metering and billing operations. 
The municipal government terminated the 
contract to implement this initiative due to 
economic losses.  
* For the cases of failure, we do not identify the name of the project or specific location where it was implemented.  This was a condition set by some interviewees to release confidential information. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Success in Public Services 0.50 0.51        
2 Public-Public Collaboration 2.88 1.28 0.57       
3 Public-Private Collaboration 3.21 1.38 -0.03 0.06      
4 Public-NGO Collaboration 2.63 1.50 0.31 0.13 0.31     
5 Leadership 3.17 1.45 0.88 0.53 0.05 0.39    
6 Implementation 3.25 1.48 0.80 0.58 -0.07 0.38 0.90   
7 Resources Munificence 3.58 1.02 0.33 0.53 -0.09 0.18 0.31 0.45  
8 Political Cycle Stability 3.67 1.40 0.58 0.22 -0.02 0.25 0.66 0.60 0.25 
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Table 3. Configurations Consistent with Social Value Creation (Evidence of Impact) in 
Public Initiatives 
 
   Configurations 
Conditions   1a 1b 1c 1d 
Collaboration Type      
   Public-Public Collaboration       
   Public-Private Collaboration       
   Public-Nonprofit Collaboration       
Public Operational Capacity      
   Leadership      
   Execution Capability      
Environment Contingencies      
   Resource Munificence     
   Political Stability      
      
Consistency  0.848 0.790 0.875 1.000 
Raw Coverage  0.306 0.417 0.193 0.083 
Unique Coverage  0.112 0.223 0.027 0.028 
      
Overall solution consistency  0.816 
Overall solution coverage    0.612 
Notes: Black circles ("●") indicate the presence of a condition, and open circles ("") indicate its absence. Blank spaces indicate a “don’t care” 
situation, that is, the condition is not relevant to that particular configuration. Only configurations with unique coverage are represented. 
 
Table 4. Configurations Consistent with Failure in Public Initiatives 
 
  Configurations 
Conditions 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 2g 
Collaboration Type        
   Public-Public Collaboration         
   Public-Private Collaboration        
   Public-Nonprofit Collaboration        
Public Operational Capacity        
   Leadership       
   Execution Capability       
Environment Contingencies        
   Resource Munificence        
   Political Stability        
        
Consistency 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Raw Coverage 0.082 0.305 0.388 0.166 0.222 0.222 0.139 
Unique Coverage 0.027 0.027 0.056 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
        
Overall solution consistency 1.000 
Overall solution coverage  0.722 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 5.  Plural Collaborations and their Underlying Mechanisms Leading to Social Value 
 
Collaborative 
Configuration 
Contextual Factors 
Mechanism Leading to the Contextual Complementarity 
between Collaboration Types 
Public Opera-
tional Capacity 
Resource 
Munificence 
Political 
Stability 
Public-public  
(absence of public-
private) (1a) 
High High High 
None; this is a non-plural internal hybrid.  Very favorable contextual 
conditions imply that governments can leverage internal resources, 
avoiding public opposition against “privatization” initiatives, and 
capitalizing on recurring internal collaborative ties. 
Plural public-public 
and public-nonprofit 
(1b) 
High High or low High 
High political stability allows governments to forge stable public-
public collaborations supporting the project.  However, because 
resource munificence is not necessarily present, collaboration with 
nonprofit firms can help bring new specialized knowledge and 
operational resources, thus complementing the efforts of the internal 
bureaucracy.      
Plural public-public 
and public-nonprofit  
(absence of public-
private) (1c) 
High High High or low 
High resource munificence reduces the legitimacy of for-profit 
participation and allows the government to mobilize internal 
resources and internal collaborative ties.  However, because political 
stability is not necessarily present, internal ties may be weakened 
over time.  In this context, public-nonprofit collaborations can help 
promote the continuation of the innovation projects and act as 
repositories of cumulative knowledge.   
Plural public-
nonprofit and 
public-private (1d) 
High Low High 
Low resource munificence helps legitimize the participation of for-
profit firms—the justification is that the public sector can benefit 
from the funding, knowledge, skills, and organizational resources of 
private firms.  High political stability, in turn, guarantees that for-
profit firms can deploy their private resources with reduced risk of 
expropriation.  At the same time, collaboration with mission-driven 
nonprofit firms helps temper profit-maximizing pressures from for-
profit actors, as well as bringing knowledge and experience of 
working with targeted communities.  
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